In this paper, we formalize and prove the statement that coincidences cannot be accidental, a statement that underlies many useful heuristics in mathematics and physics.
Coincidences are not Accidental: A Useful Empirical Fact
Coincidences happen. In mathematics and physics, discoveries often start when someone notices a strange coincidence. For example:
a large number that has some meaning in one theory is surprisingly equal to the value that was obtained in another theory from quite di erent reasons, or the two functions, that have been de ned in two di erent ways in two di erent theories, surprisingly coincide, or classi cations of two di erent kinds of objects turn out to be surprisingly similar.
Coincidences are useful. Many mathematicians and physicists believe that a coincidence cannot be accidental. So, a theory is created to explain this \empirical" coincidence.
For example, a crucial point in the development of nineteenth-century analysis was when Gauss observed that the value of a certain elliptic integral coincides with a number de ned in a seemingly di erent way. This coincidence lead him to a general theorem that explained this coincidence and laid the foundation for an essential part of modern mathematics (for a more detailed description of this situation, see, e.g., 1]).
Similarly, electromagnetic waves were discovered when it turned out that a certain combination of parameters of Maxwell's equations coincides with the velocity of light. This kind of reasoning is still very fruitful nowadays. To our viewpoint, the most interesting current example of such a fruitful coincidence is presented in the introduction to 5] (see also 4, 10, 2]). The prime divisors of the largest nonstandard simple group (called the \Monster") turned out to coincide with the primes, for which some speci c surface has genus 0; the minimal dimension (196, 883) in which this group can be realized as a natural transformation group di ers only by 1 from the smallest nontrivial coe cient of a seemingly unrelated special mathematical function (called the normalized modular invariant function), etc. All these coincidences, that may seem purely accidental at rst glance, lead to a deep mathematical theory that combines: nite groups, Lie algebras, and conformal quantum eld theory.
The rst 40 pages of the monograph 4] are literally lled with coincidences, so that by the moment when the reader reaches page xl, she will agree with the authors' phrase that \coincidences should not be taken lightly".
Coincidences-based heuristics work, but why? For many mathematicians and physicists, there is no doubt that su ciently nontrivial coincidences should not be accidental. No doubt | but no general theorem as well.
The main goal of the present paper is to present a theorem explicitly saying that coincidences are not accidental.
Towards a Mathematical Description of the Problem

What is a coincidence?
The main idea is this: coincidence means that two di erent de nitions lead to the same object (number, function, classi cation, etc.).
To get more precise, let us remark that any de nition of an object can be arti cially made more complicated and still de ne the same object. For example, the number can be de ned as the smallest positive real number x for which sin(x) = 0. We can arti cially complicate this de nition, e.g., by taking an arbitrary true statement S (e.g., a formula stating that sin(y + z) = sin(y) cos(z)+cos(y) sin(z) is true for all y and z), and de ne x as the smallest positive real number for which sin(x) = 0 and the statement S is true.
In view of this possibility, it is not really surprising when the same object x has two de nitions of di erent length, one shorter and one longer. A true coincidence that deserves our attention is, therefore, when we have two (di erent) de nitions of the same length that de ne the same object.
What does \not accidental" mean?
When we say that the coincidence between two di erently de ned objects is not accidental, we mean that there must exist a deeper explanation for this coincidence. This \deeper explanation" may mean two things:
It may mean that within this same theory, there exists a third, simpler (= shorter) de nition of this same object x (thus explaining the two other de nitions as, kind of, complications of this shorter, more basic new denition), It may also mean that there exists an alternative theory that is more fundamental than the original theory, more fundamental in the sense that:
{ each object that is de nable in the old theory is also de nable in the new one; { for each de nition of an arbitrary object y in the old theory, there is a de nition of this same object in the new theory that is not more complicated (= not longer) than the given de nition in the old theory; and { at least one object has a simpler (= shorter) de nition in the new theory.
To formalize the above idea, we must describe what \de nable" means
What \de nable" means: in short. The above description uses the word \de nable object", \length of the de nition", etc. Usually, we say that a formula F(x) with one free variable de nes an object x if x is the only object that makes this formula true, i.e., if:
F(x) is true for this object x, and F(y) is false for every other object y 6 = x.
Auxiliary notions that we need to formalize what is the result of applying a formula F(:) with one free variable to an object x; and when is a statement (formula without free variables) true.
Preliminary remark: we must x the alphabet. Objects, formulas, and statements are all representable by sequences of symbols (\words") in a certain alphabet. So, we will assume that some nite alphabet is xed, and objects, formulas, statements, etc., are words in this alphabet.
Describing the set of true statements. Let us rst describe the set of true statements. In mathematics, to describe which statements are true and which are not, we usually describe two things:
we describe axioms, i.e., statements that we initially assume to be true, and we describe deduction rules, i.e., rules that enable us to go from some statements, which are already known to be true, to new true statements. For example, if the alphabet contains \and" & with its usual meaning, then from the truth of A and B we can deduce that the statement A&B is also true.
In mathematical logic, this combination of axioms and deduction rules is usually called a theory. When a theory is given, this means that we can eventually generate all possible true statements:
we start with the axioms;
we apply all applicable deduction rules to the axioms, and thus get new statements that are true;
we apply all applicable deduction rules to thus enlarged set of true statements, and, hopefully, conclude that some other statements are true; etc.
Thus, the set of all true statements possesses an algorithm that generates, one by one, all the elements of this set (this set may be in nite, so it may take in nitely long to generate all the elements from this set). In mathematical logic and theory of computing, such sets are called recursively enumerable (r.e., for short).
There exist more complicated methods of describing a theory, but in all these methods, the set of true statements is r.e.
So, by a set of true statements, we will mean a r.e. set of words.
What are formulas and statements? Some theories have an additional algorithmic property that they are decidable, i.e., that there exists an algorithm that, given a statement, checks whether this statements is true or not. Most non-trivial theories are not decidable. But even in these theories, while it is algorithmically impossible to check whether a statement is true or not, it is usually algorithmically possible (and easy) to determine whether a given combination of symbols is indeed a correctly build statement. E.g., in the rst order theory of real numbers, one can easily check that 9x(x x = x) is a grammatically correct statement, while 9x(x = is not.
Thus, by a set of statements, we will mean a decidable subset of the set of all words. Similarly, the set of all formulas with one free variable is another decidable subset of the same set of all words (that does not intersect with the rst one).
Only statements (i.e., formulas without free variables) can be true; a formula F(:) with a free variable can be true or false depending on what we apply it to.
What are objects. Objects are usually de ned as constructions that satisfy certain properties. Usually, we have an algorithm that generates all possible objects; e.g., the set of all natural numbers can be de ned if we start with 0 and 1 and add 0's and 1s. Thus, we will de ne the set of all objects as a r.e. set of words.
In some cases, this set is decidable, but we do not want to lose generality, so, we will not impose this additional requirement.
Substitution. If we have a formula F(:) with one free variable, and an object x, then we can substitute the object x into the formula F(:) and get a statement F(x) (i.e., a formula with no free variables). Substitution is an algorithmic (and easy) operation, so, we will assume that there exists an algorithm that transforms a pair, consisting of a formula with one free variable and an object, into a statement (i.e., into a formula without free variables). Now, we are ready for the formal de nitions.
De nitions and the Main Result
De nition 1. Let a nite set A be given. This set will be called an alphabet,
and its elements will be called symbols.
An arbitrary nite sequence of symbols will be called a word. The set of all words will be denoted by W.
For each word w 2 W, we will denote its number of symbols (length) by len(w).
By a language, we mean a tuple L = hA; F; S; O; subi, where: { F is a decidable subset of the set W; its elements will be called formulas with one free variable, or simply formulas; { S is a decidable subset of the set W for which F \S = ;; elements of the set S will be called formulas without free variables, or statements; { O is a r.e. subset of the set W; its elements will be called objects; and { sub : F O ! S is an algorithmic (computable) function that transforms each pair (F; x), where F 2 F and x 2 O, into a statement sub(F; x) 2 S; for simplicity, we will also denote sub(F; x) by F(x).
De nition 2. Let a language L = hA; F; S; O; subi be given. By a theory, we mean a r.e. subset T S. We say that a statement S 2 S is true in a theory T if S 2 T. We will say that a formula F 2 F is true for an object x if the statement F(x) is true (i.e., if F(x) 2 T).
De nition 3. Let a language L = hA; F; S; O; subi be given, and let T be a theory.
We say that a formula F with one free variable de nes an object x if x is the only object for which this formula is true, i.e., if { F(x) is true for this x, and { F(y) is not true for any other object y 6 = x. If a formula F 2 F de nes an object x, we say that the formula F is a de nition of the object x. We say that an object is de nable in a theory T if it has a de nition in this theory.
We say that a theory T is non-trivial if in nitely many objects are de nable in this theory.
We say that a de nition F is simpler than the de nition Auxiliary result. To construct the desired new theory T 0 , let us rst show that in T, there exists an object whose shortest possible de nition is longer than len(F).
Indeed:
On one hand, there are nitely many words of length len(F), and thus, only nitely many di erent objects can be de ned by such \short" formulas.
On the other hand, the theory T is assumed to be non-trivial, in the sense that in nitely many objects are de nable in this theory.
Therefore, there exist an object z whose every de nition in T is longer than F.
Construction of a new theory. Since the formula F It is easy to check that T 0 is a r.e. set, i.e., a theory.
Three conditions that we need to prove in order to show that the new theory is more fundamental. Let us show that T 0 is indeed more fundamental than T. According to the de nition of a more fundamental theory, we must prove three things:
that each object that is de nable in the theory T is also de nable in the theory T 0 ; that for each de nition F of an arbitrary object y in the theory T, there is a de nition F 0 of this same object in the theory T 0 that is not more complicated than F; and that there exists an object y and its de nition in T 0 that is easier than any of de nitions of this object y in the theory T.
Proving the rst condition. Let us rst prove the rst condition, that each object that is de nable in the theory T is also de nable in the theory T 0 . Indeed:
The object x is de nable in T 0 , namely, it is de nable by the property F. Indeed: { F(x) is still true (i.e., 2 T), and { for every y 6 = x, F(y) is still not true.
The object z is de nable by the formula F Every other object y 6 = x, y 6 = z, which was de ned in T by some formula For every other object y 6 = x, y 6 = z, every formula F that de nes y in the theory T de nes the same object in the new theory and therefore, the new de nition is not longer than the old one.
Proving the third condition. While proving the second condition, we also proved that for the object z, the formula F 0 that de nes this object T 0 is easier than any of the formulas that de ne this same object in the original theory T.
The theorem is proven. Three conditions are proven. Thus, the theory T 0 is indeed more fundamental than T. The theorem is proven.
A2. Relation to Kolmogorov complexity
Similarity. In our proof, for an object x, we considered the shortest length len(F) of a formula that de nes this object:
d(x) = minflen(F) j F de nes xg:
Thus de ned notion is very similar to the notion of Kolmogorov complexity (see, e. g., 9]): the Kolmogorov complexity K(x) of an object x is de ned as the shortest length of a program that computes x. To get our notion from Kolmogorov complexity, we must:
replace programs with formulas, and replace computing with de ning.
Similarity explained. The similarity between our notion and Kolmogorov complexity is not accidental: one of the main objectives of introducing the notion of Kolmogorov complexity was to formalize the notions of randomness, \accidentalness" (see, e.g., physical applications in 9, 6, 7, 8, 3], and formalizing of \accidentalness" is exactly what we are interested in.
Possible research directions. In view of the meaningfullness of our analogue of Kolmogorov complexity, it may be desirable to analyze this analogue as the Kolmogorov complexity itself has been analyzed 9]. Hopefully, this analysis will lead to new physically meaningful applications.
